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Abstract
We consider a secure communication over a two-user Gaussian interference channel, where each transmitter
sends a confidential message to its legitimate receiver. For this setting, we identify a regime where the simple scheme
of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter (without cooperative jamming) and treating interference as
noise at each intended receiver (in short, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within
a constant gap. For the symmetric case, this simple scheme is optimal when the interference-to-signal ratio (all
link strengths in decibel scale) is no more than 2/3. However, when the ratio is more than 2/3, we show that this
simple scheme is not optimal anymore and a scheme with cooperative jamming is proposed to achieve the optimal
secure sum generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF). Specifically, for the symmetric case, we complete the optimal
secure sum GDoF characterization for all the interference regimes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information-theoretic secrecy was first introduced by Shannon in his seminal work [1],
which studied a secure communication in the presence of a private key that is revealed to both transmitter
and legitimate receiver but not to the eavesdropper. Later, Wyner introduced the notion of secure capacity
via a degraded wiretap channel, in which a transmitter intends to send a confidential message to a legitimate
receiver by hiding it from a degraded eavesdropper [2]. The secure capacity is the maximum rate at which
the confidential message can be transmitted reliably and securely to the legitimate receiver. Wyner’s result
was subsequently generalized to the non-degraded wiretap channel by Csisza`r and Ko¨rner [3], and the
Gaussian wiretap channel by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [4]. This line of secure capacity research
has been extended to many multiuser channels, most notably, broadcast channels [5]–[9], multiple access
channels [10]–[15], and interference channels [5], [16]–[29].
In the line of secure capacity research, cooperative jamming has been proposed extensively to improve
the achievable secure rates in many channels (see [5], [10], [22], [23] and references therein). In particular,
cooperative jamming has been proposed in [22] and [23] to achieve the optimal secure sum degrees-of-
freedom (DoF) in the interference channel with confidential messages, wiretap channel with helpers,
multiple access wiretap channel, and broadcast channel with confidential messages. The basic idea of the
cooperative jamming scheme is to send jamming signals to confuse the potential eavesdroppers, while
keeping legitimate receivers’ abilities to decode the desired messages. This might involve a cooperation
between the transmitters, and a careful design on the direction and/or power of the cooperative jamming
signals (see [5], [10], [22], [23]). It is therefore implicit that the cooperative jamming schemes might incur
some extra overhead, e.g., due to network coordination, channel state information (CSI) acquisition, and
power consumption. In this work we seek to understand when it is necessary to use cooperative jamming
and when it is not, for the secure communication over the interference channel.
Specifically, we focus on a secure communication over a two-user Gaussian interference channel, where
each transmitter sends a confidential message to its legitimate receiver. For this setting, we identify a
regime in which the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter, without
cooperative jamming, and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (in short, GWC-TIN
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2scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. The secrecy offered by
this GWC-TIN scheme is information-theoretic secrecy, which holds for any decoding methods at any
unintended receiver (eavesdropper). In this simple scheme, the transmitters do not need to know all
the information of channel realizations. Therefore, the overhead associated with acquiring channel state
information at the transmitters (CSIT) is minimal for the GWC-TIN scheme. For the symmetric case,
this simple scheme is optimal when the interference-to-signal ratio (all link strengths in decibel scale),
denoted by α, is no more than 2/3, i.e., 0 ≤ α ≤ 2/3. However, when the ratio is more than 2/3, we
show that this simple scheme is not optimal anymore and a scheme with cooperative jamming is proposed
to achieve the optimal secure sum generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF).
Some related works: For a two-user Gaussian interference channel without secrecy constraints, the
capacity has been characterized to within one bit in [30] for a decade. Our work focuses on the secure
capacity approximation for the case with secrecy constraints. Specifically, for the symmetric case this work
completes the full characterization on secure sum GDoF for all the interference regimes. Furthermore, this
work identifies a regime in which the low-complexity scheme, i.e., the GWC-TIN scheme, achieves the
optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. The low-complexity communication schemes have
received significant attention in the literature (see, e.g., [31]). Specifically, the work in [31] considered
the Gaussian interference channel without secrecy constraints and investigated the optimality of the low-
complexity scheme that treats interference as noise (TIN scheme), in terms of GDoF region and constant-
gap capacity region. For the Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints, the previous work in
[28] showed that secrecy constraints incur no penalty in GDoF, i.e., the secure GDoF region and the GDoF
region remain the same under the condition in which the TIN scheme was proved to be GDoF-optimal
(cf. [31]). Note that for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel, the condition identified
in [31] for the TIN scheme to be GDoF-optimal—the same condition in which secrecy constraints incur
no penalty in GDoF (cf. [28])—is simplified to 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2. Interestingly, for the two-user symmetric
Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints, our work shows that the proposed low-complexity
scheme (GWC-TIN scheme) is optimal in terms of secure sum GDoF if and only if 0 ≤ α ≤ 2/3. When
α > 2/3, our work also characterizes the optimal secure sum GDoF, which is achievable by the proposed
scheme using interference alignment and cooperative jamming. In addition to the new achievability scheme,
our work also provides a new converse to prove the results. In a related work in [27], the authors
considered the two-user symmetric deterministic interference channel and provided the upper bound and
lower bound on the secure symmetric capacity. Note that, there is still a gap between the upper bound
and lower bound derived in [27], when the interference-to-signal ratio α (all link strengths now measured
in bits) is 1/2 < α < 3/4. In our work in [32] (conference version), we closed the gap by providing a
new capacity upper bound. In a related work in [26], the authors considered the secure communication
over a two-user symmetric interference channel with transmitter cooperation, and provided the secure
capacity upper bound and lower bound. Note that, for the deterministic channel model and removing the
transmitter cooperation, the upper bound and lower bound derived in [26] are not matched for some channel
parameters. We believe that our optimal secure GDoF results derived in our setting can be extended to
solve the open problems in the other communication channels, including the channel considered in [26].
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model and the simple
scheme without cooperative jamming. Section III provides the main results of this work. A scheme with
cooperative jamming is proposed in Sections IV. Some analysis on the cooperative jamming scheme
is provided in Section V and the appendices. The converse proof is provided in Section VI and the
appendices. The work is concluded in Section VII. Throughout this work, I(•), H(•) and h(•) denote the
mutual information, entropy and differential entropy, respectively. (•)T and (•)−1 denote the transpose and
inverse operations, respectively. Fq2 denotes a set of q-tuples of binary numbers. Z , Z+ and R denote the
sets of integers, positive integers, and real numbers, respectively. o(•) comes from the standard Landau
notation, where f(x) = o(g(x)) implies that limx→∞ f(x)/g(x) = 0. (•)+ = max{0, •}. Logarithms are
in base 2. Unless for some specific parameters, matrix, scalar, and vector are usually denoted by the italic
uppercase symbol (e.g., S), italic lowercase symbol (e.g., s), and the bold italic lowercase symbol (e.g.,
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Fig. 1. Two-user interference channel with confidential messages.
s), respectively. s ∼ N (0, σ2) denotes that the random variable s has a normal distribution with zero
mean and σ2 variance.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
This section provides the system model and discusses the simple scheme without using cooperative
jamming.
A. Gaussian interference channel
We begin with a two-user (K = 2) Gaussian interference channel (see Fig. 1). By following the
convention in [33], the channel output at receiver k at time t is given by
yk(t) =
K∑
`=1
2mk`hk`x`(t) + zk(t), k = 1, · · · , K (1)
t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where x`(t) is the channel input at transmitter ` subject to a normalized power constraint
E|x`(t)|2 ≤ 1, zk(t) ∼ N (0, 1) is additive white Gaussian noise at receiver k, mk` is a nonnegative integer,
and hk` ∈ (1, 2], for k, ` ∈ {1, · · · , K}. Note that all the channel gains greater than or equal to one can be
represented in the form of 2mk`hk`. Thus, the model in (1) can represent the general cases of the channels
in terms of capacity approximations. Let us define
αk`,
log 2mk`
1
2
logP
k, ` ∈ {1, · · · , K} (2)
where P ,maxk{22mkk}. Then, the original channel model can be rewritten by
yk(t) =
K∑
`=1
√
Pαk`hk`x`(t) + zk(t), k = 1, · · · , K (3)
where the exponent αk` ≥ 0 represents the channel strength of the link between transmitter ` and receiver k,
and hk` ∈ (1, 2] represents the normalized channel coefficient (we call it as channel phase). In what follows,
we will consider the channel model in (3). It is assumed that each node knows all the channel strengths
and phases. However, in the scheme without using cooperative jamming that will be discussed later on,
the transmitters do not need to know the channel phases {hk`}k,`. For the symmetric case, it is assumed
that
α11 = α22 = 1, α21 = α12 = α, α ≥ 0.
For this interference channel, transmitter k wishes to send to receiver k a confidential message wk
that is uniformly chosen from a set Wk,{1, 2, · · · , 2nRk}, where Rk is the rate (bits/channel use) of
this message and n is the total number of channel uses. At each transmitter, a corresponding stochastic
function is employed to map the message to a transmitted codeword (cf. [5], [10], [19], [22], [23] and
references therein). Specifically, at transmitter k, the following function
fk :Wk ×W ′k ×W ′′k → Rn, k = 1, 2
4maps the message wk ∈ Wk to a transmitted codeword xnk = fk(wk, w′k, w′′k) ∈ Rn, where w′k ∈ W ′k and
w′′k ∈ W ′′k represent the randomness in this mapping, and {w′k, w′′k} are available at transmitter k only
(cf. [19]). The random variables {w1, w′1, w′′1 , w2, w′2, w′′2} are assumed to be mutually independent. In our
setting, the randomness coming from w′k at transmitter k is used to guarantee the security (see (5) and
(6) below) of its own confidential message wk; while the randomness coming from w′′k at transmitter k
is used to potentially improve the secure rate of the other transmitter’s confidential message. Thus, w′′k
can be treated as the helping randomness and the signal mapped from w′′k can be treated as a cooperative
jamming signal. Hereafter, when any of w′′1 and w
′′
2 are used in a communication scheme, we will call it
as a scheme with cooperative jamming. When w′′1 and w
′′
2 are not used in a communication scheme, i.e.,
W ′′1 =W ′′2 = φ, we will call it as a scheme without cooperative jamming. A secure rate pair (R1, R2) is
said to be achievable if for any  > 0 there exists a sequence of n-length codes such that each receiver
can decode its own message reliably, i.e.,
Pr[wk 6= wˆk] ≤ , ∀k (4)
and the messages are kept secret such that
I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n (5)
I(w2; yn1 ) ≤ n (6)
where ynk represents the n-length channel output of receiver k, k = 1, 2. The secure capacity region C is
the closure of the set of all achievable secure rate pairs. The secure sum capacity is defined as:
Csum, sup
{
R1 +R2| (R1, R2) ∈ C
}
. (7)
The secure sum GDoF is defined as
dsum, lim
P→∞
Csum
1
2
logP
. (8)
B. A scheme without cooperative jamming
This subsection discusses a scheme without cooperative jamming, for the two-user Gaussian interference
channel defined in Section II-A. In the proposed scheme without cooperative jamming, each transmitter
simply employs a Gaussian wiretap codebook (GWC) to guarantee the secrecy without using cooperative
jamming, while each receiver simply treats interference as noise (TIN) when decoding its desired message.
It is called as a GWC-TIN scheme hereafter. Note that the secrecy offered by the GWC-TIN scheme is
information-theoretic secrecy, which holds for any decoding methods at any eavesdropper. Some details
of the scheme are discussed as follows.
1) Gaussian wiretap codebook: To build the codebook, transmitter k generates a total of 2n(Rk+R′k)
independent codewords vnk with each element independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to
a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance P−βk , k = 1, 2, for some Rk, R′k and βk ≥ 0 that
will be designed specifically later on. The codebook Bk is defined as a set of the labeled codewords:
Bk,
{
vnk (wk, w
′
k) : wk ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nRk}, w′k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
k}}, k = 1, 2. (9)
To transmit the message wk, transmitter k at first selects a bin (sub-codebook) Bk(wk) that is defined as
Bk(wk),
{
vnk (wk, w
′
k) : w
′
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
k}}, k = 1, 2
and then randomly chooses a codeword vnk from the selected bin according to a uniform distribution.
Since this scheme will not use cooperative jamming, the chosen codeword vnk will be mapped exactly
as a channel input sequence by transmitter k, that is, xk(t) = vk(t), t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where vk(t) is the
5tth element of the codeword vnk , k = 1, 2. Based on this one-to-one mapping and Gaussian codebook, it
implies that
xk(t) = vk(t) ∼ N (0, P−βk), ∀t, k = 1, 2. (10)
Then, the received signals take the following forms (removing the time index for simplicity):
y1 =
√
Pα11h11v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
|h11|2Pα11−β1
+
√
Pα12h12v2︸ ︷︷ ︸
|h12|2Pα12−β2
+ z1︸︷︷︸
P 0
, (11)
y2 =
√
Pα22h22v2︸ ︷︷ ︸
|h22|2Pα22−β2
+
√
Pα21h21v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
|h21|2Pα21−β1
+ z2︸︷︷︸
P 0
(12)
(cf. (3)). In the above equations, the average power is noted under each summand term.
2) Treating interference as noise: In terms of decoding, each intended receiver simply treats interference
as noise. This implies that receiver k can decode the codeword vnk (wk, w
′
k) with arbitrarily small error
probability when n gets large and the rate of the codeword (i.e., Rk+R′k) satisfies the following condition:
Rk +R
′
k < I(vk; yk), k = 1, 2 (13)
(cf. [34]). Note that Rk and R′k represent the rates of the secure message wk and the confusion message
w′k, respectively (cf. (9)). Once the codeword v
n
k (wk, w
′
k) is decoded, the message wk can be decoded
directly from the codebook mapping. At this point, let us set
Rk, I(vk; yk)− I(vk; y`|v`)− , (14)
R′k, I(vk; y`|v`)−  (15)
for some  > 0 and k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= `. Obviously, Rk and R′k designed in (14) and (15) satisfy the
condition in (13).
3) Secure rate: From the proof of [23, Theorem 2] (or [5, Theorem 2]) it implies that, given the
above wiretap codebook and the rates designed in (14) and (15), the messages w1 and w2 are secure from
their eavesdroppers, that is, I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n and I(w2; yn1 ) ≤ n. Therefore, by letting  → 0, the scheme
achieves the secure rate pair R1 = I(v1; y1) − I(v1; y2|v2) and R2 = I(v2; y2) − I(v2; y1|v1). Due to the
Gaussian inputs and outputs, this achievable secure rate pair is expressed as
R1 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
|h11|2Pα11−β1
1 + |h12|2Pα12−β2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I(v1;y1)
− 1
2
log(1 + |h21|2Pα21−β1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I(v1;y2|v2)
R2 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
|h22|2Pα22−β2
1 + |h21|2Pα21−β1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I(v2;y2)
− 1
2
log(1 + |h12|2Pα12−β2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I(v2;y1|v1)
for some β1, β2 ≥ 0. By setting β1 = α21 and β2 = α12, then the interference at each receiver is scaled
down to the noise level (see (11) and (12)) and the achievable secure rate pair becomes
R1 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
|h11|2Pα11−α21
1 + |h12|2
)− 1
2
log(1 + |h21|2) (16)
R2 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
|h22|2Pα22−α12
1 + |h21|2
)− 1
2
log(1 + |h12|2). (17)
Note that the above secure rate pair is achieved by using a simple choice of β1 and β2. One can improve
the secure rate pair by selecting the optimized parameters of β1 and β2. From the achievable secure rate
pair expressed in (16) and (17), it implies that the GWC-TIN scheme achieves the following secure sum
GDoF
dGTsum = (α11 − α21)+ + (α22 − α12)+. (18)
Note that in this GWC-TIN scheme, the transmitters do not need to know the realizations of {hk`}k,`.
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Fig. 2. GDoF vs. α for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with and without secrecy constraints. Note that a simple
scheme without using cooperative jamming achieves the optimal secure sum GDoF if and only if α ∈ [0, 2
3
].
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we provide the main results of this work. At first we provide the secure sum GDoF
characterization for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A.
Theorem 1. Considering the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A,
for almost all channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, the optimal secure sum GDoF is characterized as
dsum =

2(1− α) for 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
(19a)
2(2α− 1) for 2
3
≤ α ≤ 3
4
(19b)
2(1− 2α/3) for 3
4
≤ α ≤ 1 (19c)
2α/3 for 1 ≤ α ≤ 3
2
(19d)
2(2− α) for 3
2
≤ α ≤ 2 (19e)
0 for 2 ≤ α . (19f)
Moreover, a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming, that is, GWC-TIN scheme, achieves the
optimal GDoF if and only if α ∈ [0, 2
3
].
Proof. The converse follows from Lemma 8 and Corollary 1 provided in Section VI. When α ∈ [0, 2
3
],
the optimal secure sum GDoF is achievable by the proposed GWC-TIN scheme (see (18)). When α ∈
(2
3
, 2), the optimal secure sum GDoF is achievable by the proposed scheme with cooperative jamming.
Section IV provides the cooperative jamming scheme for achieving the optimal secure sum GDoF when
α ∈ (2
3
, 2).
Fig. 2 depicts the sum GDoF with secrecy constraint (cf. Theorem 1), as well as the sum GDoF
without secrecy constraint (cf. [30]), for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel. Note that
the secrecy constraint incurs no penalty in sum GDoF if and only if α ∈ [0, 1
2
]. In the following we focus
on the general two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, and provide the optimality
conditions in which the GWC-TIN scheme is optimal in terms of secure sum capacity to within a constant
gap.
Theorem 2. For the two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, where αk` denotes the
channel strength from transmitter ` to receiver k, ∀k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, if the following conditions are satisfied,
α22 + (α11 − α12)+ ≥ α21 + α12, (20)
α11 + (α22 − α21)+ ≥ α21 + α12 (21)
7then the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter (without using cooperative
jamming) and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (that is, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves
the optimal secure sum capacity Csum to within a constant gap of no larger than 11 bits. More specifically,
given the conditions of (20) and (21), the optimal secure sum capacity Csum satisfies
C lbsum ≤ Csum ≤ C lbsum + 11
where the lower bound C lbsum is defined by
C lbsum,
1
2
log
(
1 +
|h11|2Pα11−α21
1 + |h12|2
)− 1
2
log(1 + |h21|2) + 1
2
log
(
1 +
|h22|2Pα22−α12
1 + |h21|2
)− 1
2
log(1 + |h12|2).
Proof. As discussed in Section II-B, the GWC-TIN scheme achieves the secure sum capacity lower bound
C lbsum (see (16) and (17)). To prove the optimality of GWC-TIN scheme, we provide a secure sum capacity
upper bound in Lemma 8 (see (124) in Section VI). The derived upper bound reveals that, if the conditions
in (20) and (21) are satisfied, then the achievable secure sum rate of GWC-TIN scheme indeed approaches
the secure sum capacity to within a constant gap of no larger than 11 bits (see Appendix B for the details
on bounding the gap).
IV. COOPERATIVE JAMMING SCHEME
This section provides the cooperative jamming scheme for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference
channel defined in Section II-A, focusing on the regime of 2
3
< α ≤ 2. Note that when 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
, a
scheme without cooperative jamming has been proposed in Section II-B to achieve the optimal secure sum
capacity to within a constant gap (see Theorem 2). In this cooperative jamming scheme, pulse amplitude
modulation (PAM) and interference alignment will be used.
At first let us review the PAM modulation, which will be used in our cooperative jamming scheme
described later. Assume that a random variable x is uniformly drawn from a PAM constellation set, defined
as
Ω(ξ,Q),{ξ · a : a ∈ Z ∩ [−Q,Q]} (22)
for some Q ∈ Z+ and ξ ∈ R. The role of ξ is to regularize the average power of x. Given that x is
uniformly drawn from Ω(ξ,Q), the average power of x is
E|x|2 = 2ξ
2
2Q+ 1
Q∑
i=1
i2 =
ξ2Q(Q+ 1)
3
(23)
which implies that
E|x|2 ≤ 1/3 < 1, if ξ ≤ 1√
2Q
. (24)
Let us consider the communication of x over a channel model given as
y =
√
Pα1hx+
√
Pα2g + z. (25)
In the above channel model, x ∈ Ω(ξ,Q) is the input with a normalized power constraint E|x|2 ≤ 1.
z ∼ N (0, σ2) is additive white Gaussian noise. g ∈ Sg is a discrete random variable such that
|g| ≤ gmax, ∀g ∈ Sg
for a given set Sg ⊂ R, where gmax is a positive and finite constant independent of P . In this setting
α1, α2, σ and h are four given positive and finite parameters independent of P . Note that, the minimum
distance of the constellation for
√
Pα1hx is
dmin(
√
Pα1hx) =
√
Pα1h · ξ. (26)
8For this setting, we have the following result regarding the probability of error for decoding x from y.
Lemma 1. Consider the channel model in (25) and consider the case of α1 − α2 > 0. By setting Q and
ξ such that
Q =
P
α¯
2 · hγ
2gmax
, ξ = γ · 1
Q
, ∀α¯ ∈ (0, α1 − α2) (27)
where γ > 0 is a finite constant independent of P , then the probability of error for decoding a symbol x
from y is
Pr(e)→ 0 as P →∞.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Now let us go back to the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A. For
this setting, we will provide a cooperative jamming scheme by using PAM modulation and interference
alignment. For the proposed scheme, the details of codebook generation, signal mapping, secure rate
analysis, PAM constellation, and interference alignment are provided as follows.
1) Codebook generation and signal mapping: To build the codebook, transmitter k, k = 1, 2, generates
a total of 2n(Rk+R′k) independent sequences (codewords) vnk , where all the elements of all the sequences
are independent and identically distributed according to a distribution that will be designed specifically
in the scheme, and Rk, R′k will be defined later on. The codebook Bk is defined as a set of the labeled
codewords:
Bk,
{
vnk (wk, w
′
k) : wk ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nRk}, w′k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
k}
}
, k = 1, 2. (28)
To transmit the message wk, transmitter k at first selects a bin (sub-codebook) Bk(wk) that is defined as
Bk(wk),
{
vnk (wk, w
′
k) : w
′
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
k}}, k = 1, 2
and then randomly chooses a codeword vnk from the selected bin according to a uniform distribution.
Since this scheme uses cooperative jamming, the chosen codeword vnk will be mapped to the channel
input using a stochastic function given as
xk(t) = h`` · vk(t) +
√
P−βuk · hk` · uk(t) (29)
for ` 6= k, k, ` = 1, 2, and t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where βuk is a parameter that will be defined later, and {uk(t)}t
are i.i.d. random variables (jamming signals) uniformly and independently drawn from a constellation set
that will be designed specifically in the scheme.
2) PAM constellation and interference alignment: Specifically, the codebook at transmitter k is
generated such that each element takes the following form
vk =
√
P−βvk,c · vk,c +
√
P−βvk,p · vk,p (30)
and then the channel input in (29) becomes
xk =
√
P−βvk,c · h`` · vk,c +
√
P−βvk,p · h`` · vk,p + ·
√
P−βuk · hk` · uk (31)
(removing the time index for simplicity), for ` 6= k, k, ` = 1, 2, where vk,c, vk,p and uk are independent
random variables uniformly drawn from their PAM constellation sets,
vk,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γvk,c ·
1
Q
, Q = P
λvk,c
2 ) (32)
vk,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γvk,p ·
1
Q
, Q = P
λvk,p
2 ) (33)
uk ∈ Ω(ξ = γuk ·
1
Q
, Q = P
λuk
2 ) (34)
9TABLE I
PARAMETER DESIGN FOR THE SYMMETRIC CHANNEL, FOR SOME  > 0.
2
3
< α ≤ 3
4
3
4
≤ α ≤ 1 1 ≤ α ≤ 3
2
3
2
≤ α ≤ 2
βv1,c , βv2,c 0 0 α− 1 α− 1
βu1 , βu2 1− α 1− α 0 0
βv1,p , βv2,p α α ∞ ∞
λv1,c , λv2,c 3α− 2−  α/3−  α/3−  2− α− 
λu1 , λu2 3α− 2−  α/3−  α/3−  2− α− 
λv1,p , λv2,p 1− α−  1− α−  0 0
respectively, for k = 1, 2, where Ω(ξ,Q) is defined in (22); and {γvk,c , γvk,p , γuk} are some finite constants
independent of P , such that
γv1,c = γv2,c = γu1 = γu2 = 2γv1,p = 2γv2,p = 2γ ∈
(
0,
1
2
√
2
]
. (35)
In our scheme, {βvk,c , βvk,p , βuk , λvk,c , λvp,c , λuk}k=1,2 are given parameters designed in Table I for different
cases of α. Note that for this symmetric Gaussian interference channel, the parameters are designed
symmetrically for the two transmitters, for example, βv1,c = βv2,c and βv1,p = βv2,p . For the parameters
designed as βv1,p =∞ and λv1,p = 0, it implies that the random variable v1,p can be treated as an empty
term in the transmitted signal x1. This implication holds for the other parameters. Based on our design
on xk (see (31)-(34)) and the parameters, one can easily check that the power constraint E|xk|2 ≤ 1 is
satisfied (cf. (24)) for k = 1, 2.
Given the above design on the transmitted signals, the signals received at the receivers then take the
following forms (without the time index)
y1 =
√
P 1−βv1,ch11h22v1,c +
√
P 1−βv1,ph11h22v1,p + h12h11(
√
Pα−βv2,cv2,c +
√
P 1−βu1u1)
+
√
Pα−βu2h12h21u2 +
√
Pα−βv2,ph12h11v2,p + z1 (36)
y2 =
√
P 1−βv2,ch22h11v2,c +
√
P 1−βv2,ph22h11v2,p + h21h22(
√
Pα−βv1,cv1,c +
√
P 1−βu2u2)
+
√
Pα−βu1h21h12u1 +
√
Pα−βv1,ph21h22v1,p + z2. (37)
With the signal design in (31), the signal v2,c is aligned with the jamming signal u1 at receiver 1, while
the signal v1,c is aligned with the jamming signal u2 at receiver 2.
3) Secure rate analysis: Let us now define Rk and R′k as
Rk, I(vk; yk)− I(vk; y`|v`)−  (38)
R′k, I(vk; y`|v`)−  (39)
for some  > 0, ` 6= k, k, ` ∈ {1, 2}. From the proof of [23, Theorem 2] (or [5, Theorem 2]) it implies
that, given the above codebook and signal mapping, the rate pair (R1, R2) defined in (38) and (39) is
achievable and the messages w1 and w2 are secure from their eavesdroppers, that is, I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n and
I(w2; yn1 ) ≤ n. In what follows we will analyze the secure rate performance of the proposed scheme,
focusing on the regime of 2/3 < α ≤ 2.
10
A. Rate analysis when 2/3 < α ≤ 3/4
For the case with 2/3 < α ≤ 3/4, we design the parameters such that
βv1,c = βv2,c = 0, βu1 = βu2 = 1− α, βv1,p = βv2,p = α (40)
λv1,c = λv2,c = 3α− 2− , λu1 = λu2 = 3α− 2− , λv1,p = λv2,p = 1− α−  (41)
where  > 0 can be set arbitrarily small. In this case, the transmitted signal at transmitter k takes the
following form
xk = h`` · vk,c +
√
P−α · h`` · vk,p + ·
√
P−(1−α) · hk` · uk (42)
for ` 6= k, k, ` = 1, 2. Then the received signals at the receivers take the following forms
y1 =
√
Ph11h22v1,c +
√
P 1−αh11h22v1,p +
√
Pαh12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
P 2α−1h12h21u2 + h12h11v2,p + z1
(43)
y2 =
√
Ph22h11v2,c +
√
P 1−αh22h11v2,p +
√
Pαh21h22(v1,c + u2) +
√
P 2α−1h21h12u1 + h21h22v1,p + z2.
(44)
For the proposed jamming scheme, the secure rate pair (R1, R2) defined in (38) and (39) is achievable.
By setting → 0, this secure rate pair is expressed as
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) (45)
R2 = I(v2; y2)− I(v2; y1|v1). (46)
Let us first focus on the lower bound of R1 expressed in (45). We will begin with the lower bound of
I(v1; y1). For this case, v1 takes the form
v1 = v1,c +
√
P−α · v1,p
(see (30) and (40)). From y1 expressed in (43), {v1,c, v1,p} can be estimated by using a successive decoding
method, given the design in (32)-(34) and (40)-(42). The following lemma provides a result on the error
probability for this estimation. Later on we will use it to derive the lower bound on I(v1; y1).
Lemma 2. When 2/3 < α ≤ 3/4, given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (40)-(42), the error probability
of estimating {vk,c, vk,p} from yk is
Pr[{vk,c 6= vˆk,c} ∪ {vk,p 6= vˆk,p}]→ 0 as P →∞ (47)
for k = 1, 2, where vˆk,c and vˆk,p are the corresponding estimates for vk,c and vk,p, respectively, based on
the observation yk expressed in (43) and (44).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Since v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,c · 1Q , Q = P
3α−2−
2 ) and v1,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,p · 1Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ) are uniformly and
independently drawn from their PAM constellation sets, the rates of v1,c and v1,p are given as
H(v1,c) = log(2 · P 3α−2−2 + 1) (48)
H(v1,p) = log(2 · P 1−α−2 + 1) (49)
where  can be set as  → 0. Due to the signal design v1, v1,c +
√
P−α · v1,p (see (30)), it is true that
{v1,p, v1,c} can be reconstructed from v1, and vice versa. Then,
H(v1) = H(v1,c, v1,p) = H(v1,c) +H(v1,p)
= log(2 · P 3α−2−2 + 1) + log(2 · P 1−α−2 + 1)
=
2α− 1− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (50)
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At this point, I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥ I(v1; vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p) (51)
= H(v1)−H(v1|vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p)
≥ H(v1)−
(
1 + Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}] ·H(v1)
)
(52)
=
(
1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]
) ·H(v1)− 1 (53)
where (51) results from the Markov chain v1 → y1 → {vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p}; (52) results from Fano’s inequality. By
combining (50), (53) and Lemma 2, we have
I(v1; y1) ≥ 2α− 1− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (54)
For the term I(v1; y2|v2) in (45), we can bound it as
I(v1; y2|v2)
≤I(v1; y2, u1, v1,c + u2|v2) (55)
=I(v1; v1,c + u2|u1, v2) + I(v1; y2|u1, v2, v1,c + u2) + I(v1;u1|v2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=I(v1; v1,c + u2) + I(v1;h21h22v1,p + z2|u1, v2, v1,c + u2) (56)
=H(v1,c + u2)−H(u2) + h(h21h22v1,p + z2|u1, v2, v1,c + u2)− h(z2) (57)
≤ log(4 · P 3α−2−2 + 1)− log(2 · P 3α−2−2 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤log 2
+ h(h21h22v1,p + z2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 1
2
log(2pie(|h21|2·|h22|2·E|v1,p|2+E|z2|2))
−1
2
log(2pie) (58)
≤1 + 1
2
log(34pie)− 1
2
log(2pie) (59)
= log(2
√
17) (60)
where (55) uses the fact that adding information does not reduce the mutual information; (56) follows from
the fact that v1, v2, u1, u2 are mutually independent; (57) uses the fact that {v1,p, v1,c} can be reconstructed
from v1; (58) holds true because h(z2) = 12 log(2pie), H(u2) = log(2 · P
3α−2−
2 + 1), and H(v1,c +
u2) ≤ log(4 · P 3α−2−2 + 1); note that u2 is uniformly drawn from Ω(ξ = γu2 · 1Q , Q = P
3α−2−
2 ), and
v1,c+u2 ∈ 2 ·Ω(ξ = γu2 · 1Q , Q = P
3α−2−
2 ), where 2 ·Ω(ξ,Q),{ξ ·a : a ∈ Z ∩ [−2Q, 2Q]}; (59) follows
from the identity that log(4a + 1) − log(2a + 1) ≤ log 2 for any a ≥ 0 and the fact that Gaussian input
maximizes the differential entropy; note that E|h21h22v1,p+z2|2 = |h21|2 · |h22|2 ·E|v1,p|2 +E|z2|2 ≤ 16+1
(see (23) and (24)), where v1,p is uniformly drawn from Ω(ξ = γv1,p · 1Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ).
Finally, by incorporating (54) and (60) into (45), the secure rate R1 is lower bounded by
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2)
≥ 2α− 1− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (61)
Due to the symmetry, by interchanging the roles of users, it gives the lower bound on the secure rate R2:
R2 = I(v2; y2)− I(v2; y1|v1)
≥ 2α− 1− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (62)
By setting → 0, then the secure GDoF pair (d1 = 2α − 1, d2 = 2α − 1) is achievable by the proposed
cooperative jamming scheme when 2/3 < α ≤ 3/4.
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B. Rate analysis when 3/2 ≤ α ≤ 2
For the case with 3/2 ≤ α ≤ 2, we design the parameters such that
βv1,c = βv2,c = α− 1, βu1 = βu2 = 0, βv1,p = βv2,p =∞ (63)
λv1,c = λv2,c = 2− α− , λu1 = λu2 = 2− α− , λv1,p = λv2,p = 0 (64)
where  > 0 can be set arbitrarily small. In this case, βvk,p = ∞ and λvk,p = 0, it implies that the
random variable vk,p can be treated as an empty term in the transmitted signal xk for k = 1, 2. Then, the
transmitted signal at transmitter k takes the following form
xk =
√
P−(α−1)h`` · vk,c + hk` · uk (65)
for ` 6= k, k, ` = 1, 2. Then the received signals at the receivers take the following forms
y1 =
√
P 2−αh11h22v1,c +
√
Ph12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
Pαh12h21u2 + z1 (66)
y2 =
√
P 2−αh22h11v2,c +
√
Ph21h22(v1,c + u2) +
√
Pαh21h12u1 + z2. (67)
From (38) and (39), the proposed scheme achieves the following secure rates: R1 = I(v1; y1) −
I(v1; y2|v2) and R2 = I(v2; y2)− I(v2; y1|v1). For this case, vk takes the form
vk =
√
P−(α−1)vk,c, k = 1, 2
(see (30) and (63)). From yk expressed in (66) and (67), vk,c can be estimated by using a successive
decoding method, k = 1, 2. The following lemma provides a result on the error probability for this
estimation.
Lemma 3. When 3/2 ≤ α ≤ 2, given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (63)-(65), the error probability
of estimating vk,c from yk is
Pr[vk,c 6= vˆk,c]→ 0 as P →∞ (68)
for k = 1, 2, where vˆk,c is the corresponding estimate for vk,c based on the observation yk expressed in
(66) and (67).
Proof. See Appendix E.
We will proceed with the lower bound on the secure rate R1. In this case, given that v1,c is uniformly
drawn from Ω(ξ = γv1,c · 1Q , Q = P
2−α−
2 ) and that v1 =
√
P−(α−1)v1,c, the rate of v1 is
H(v1) = H(v1,c) = log(2 · P 2−α−2 + 1) (69)
where  can be set as → 0. Then, I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) = H(v1)−H(v1|y1)
≥ H(v1)−
(
1 + Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c}] ·H(v1)
)
(70)
=
(
1− Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]
) ·H(v1)− 1 (71)
=
2− α− 
2
logP + o(logP ) (72)
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where (70) results from Fano’s inequality; and (72) follows from (69) and Lemma 3. On the other hand,
by following the steps (55)-(60), the term I(v1; y2|v2) can be bounded as
I(v1; y2|v2)
≤I(v1; y2, u1, v1,c + u2|v2)
=I(v1; v1,c + u2|u1, v2) + I(v1; y2|u1, v2, v1,c + u2) + I(v1;u1|v2)
=I(v1; v1,c + u2) + I(v1; z2|u1, v2, v1,c + u2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(73)
=H(v1,c + u2)−H(u2) (74)
≤ log(4 · P 2−α−2 + 1)− log(2 · P 2−α−2 + 1) (75)
≤1 (76)
where (73) and (74) follow from the fact that v1, v2, u1, u2 and z2 are mutually independent; note that
v1 =
√
P−(α−1)v1,c for this case; (75) results from the facts that H(u2) = log(2 · P 2−α−2 + 1), and that
H(v1,c + u2) ≤ log(4 · P 2−α−2 + 1).
Finally, by combining the results in (72) and (76), the secure rate R1 is lower bounded by
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2)
≥ 2− α− 
2
logP + o(logP ). (77)
Due to the symmetry, by interchanging the roles of users, it gives the lower bound on the secure rate R2:
R2 = I(v2; y2)− I(v2; y1|v1)
≥ 2− α− 
2
logP + o(logP ). (78)
By setting  → 0, then the secure GDoF pair (d1 = 2 − α, d2 = 2 − α) is achievable by the proposed
cooperative jamming scheme when 3/2 ≤ α ≤ 2.
C. Rate analysis when 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1
The rate analysis for this case with 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1, as well as for the case with 1 ≤ α ≤ 3/2
described in the next subsection, is different from that for the previous two cases with 2/3 < α ≤ 3/4
and 3/2 ≤ α ≤ 2. In the previous two cases, the information signal vk can be estimated from yk by
using a successive decoding method and the error probability of this estimation vanishes as P →∞ (see
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3), which can be used to bound the secure rates Rk for k = 1, 2 (see (51)-(62) and
(70)- (78)). However, in this case, the previous successive decoding method cannot be used in the rate
analysis. Instead, we will use the approaches of noise removal and signal separation.
For the case with 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1, we design the parameters such that
βv1,c = βv2,c = 0, βu1 = βu2 = 1− α, βv1,p = βv2,p = α (79)
λv1,c = λv2,c = α/3− , λu1 = λu2 = α/3− , λv1,p = λv2,p = 1− α−  (80)
where  > 0 can be set arbitrarily small. In this case, the transmitted signal at transmitter k takes the
following form
xk = h`` · vk,c +
√
P−α · h`` · vk,p +
√
P−(1−α) · hk` · uk (81)
for ` 6= k, k, ` = 1, 2. Then the received signals at the receivers become
y1 =
√
Ph11h22v1,c +
√
P 1−αh11h22v1,p +
√
Pαh12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
P 2α−1h12h21u2 + h12h11v2,p + z1
(82)
y2 =
√
Ph22h11v2,c +
√
P 1−αh22h11v2,p +
√
Pαh21h22(v1,c + u2) +
√
P 2α−1h21h12u1 + h21h22v1,p + z2.
(83)
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From (38) and (39), the proposed scheme achieves the following secure rates: R1 = I(v1; y1) −
I(v1; y2|v2) and R2 = I(v2; y2) − I(v2; y1|v1). Let us first focus on the lower bound of R1. For this
case, v1 takes the form v1 = v1,c +
√
P−α · v1,p. From y1 expressed in (82), we will show that {v1,c, v1,p}
can be estimated with vanishing error probability when P is large, given the design in (32)-(34) and
(79)-(81). The following lemma provides a result on the error probability for this estimation.
Lemma 4. When 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1, given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (79)-(81), then for almost all
channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, the error probability of estimating {vk,c, vk,p} from yk is
Pr[{vk,c 6= vˆk,c} ∪ {vk,p 6= vˆk,p}]→ 0 as P →∞ (84)
for k = 1, 2, where vˆk,c and vˆk,p are the corresponding estimates for vk,c and vk,p, respectively, based on
the observation yk expressed in (82) and (83).
Proof. In this proof we use the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. The full details are
described in Section V.
With the result of Lemma 4, we proceed to bound the secure rate R1 by following the steps in (48)-
(62) that were used for the previous case of 2/3 < α ≤ 3/4. For this case of 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1, since
v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,c · 1Q , Q = P
α/3−
2 ) and v1,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,p · 1Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ), we have
H(v1,c) = log(2 · P
α/3−
2 + 1) (85)
H(v1,p) = log(2 · P 1−α−2 + 1) (86)
where  can be set as  → 0. Due to the signal design v1, v1,c +
√
P−α · v1,p (see (30) and (79)), it is
true that {v1,p, v1,c} can be reconstructed from v1, and vice versa. Then,
H(v1) = H(v1,c, v1,p) = H(v1,c) +H(v1,p) =
1− 2α/3− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (87)
At this point, I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥ I(v1; vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p) (88)
= H(v1)−H(v1|vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p)
≥ H(v1)−
(
1 + Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}] ·H(v1)
)
(89)
=
(
1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]
) ·H(v1)− 1 (90)
=
1− 2α/3− 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (91)
for almost all channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, where (88) results from the Markov chain v1 →
y1 → {vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p}; (89) stems from Fano’s inequality; and (91) follows from (87) and Lemma 4.
On the other hand, I(v1; y2|v2) can be bounded as
I(v1; y2|v2)
≤H(v1,c + u2)−H(u2) + h(h21h22v1,p + z2|u1, v2, v1,c + u2)− h(z2) (92)
≤ log(4 · P α/3−2 + 1)− log(2 · P α/3−2 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤log 2
+ h(h21h22v1,p + z2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 1
2
log(2pie×17)
−1
2
log(2pie) (93)
≤ log(2
√
17) (94)
where (92) follows from the steps in (55)-(57); (93) holds true because h(z2) = 12 log(2pie), H(u2) =
log(2 · P α/3−2 + 1), and H(v1,c + u2) ≤ log(4 · P α/3−2 + 1); (94) follows from the identity that log(4a+
15
1) − log(2a + 1) ≤ log 2 for any a ≥ 0 and the fact that h(h21h22v1,p + z2) ≤ 12 log(2pie(|h21|2 · |h22|2 ·
E|v1,p|2 + E|z2|2)) ≤ 12 log(2pie× 17).
Finally, with the results in (91) and (94), the secure rate R1 is lower bounded by
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) ≥ 1− 2α/3− 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (95)
for almost all the channel coefficients. Due to the symmetry, by interchanging the roles of users, it gives
the lower bound on the secure rate R2 ≥ 1−2α/3−22 logP + o(logP ). By setting  → 0, then the secure
GDoF pair (d1 = 1− 2α/3, d2 = 1− 2α/3) is achievable by the proposed cooperative jamming scheme
for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, for the case of 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1.
D. Rate analysis when 1 ≤ α ≤ 3/2
The rate analysis for this case with 1 ≤ α ≤ 3/2 also uses the approaches of noise removal and signal
separation. For this case, we design the parameters such that
βv1,c = βv2,c = α− 1, βu1 = βu2 = 0, βv1,p = βv2,p =∞ (96)
λv1,c = λv2,c = α/3− , λu1 = λu2 = α/3− , λv1,p = λv2,p = 0 (97)
where  > 0 can be set arbitrarily small. In this case, the transmitted signal at transmitter k consists of
only two symbols:
xk =
√
P−(α−1)h`` · vk,c + hk` · uk (98)
for ` 6= k, k, ` = 1, 2. Then the received signals at the receivers take the following forms
y1 =
√
P 2−αh11h22v1,c +
√
Ph12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
Pαh12h21u2 + z1 (99)
y2 =
√
P 2−αh22h11v2,c +
√
Ph21h22(v1,c + u2) +
√
Pαh21h12u1 + z2. (100)
In the following we will bound the secure rates expressed in (38) and (39). For this case, vk takes the
form
vk =
√
P−(α−1)vk,c, k = 1, 2
(see (30) and (96)). From yk expressed in (99) and (100), vk,c can be estimated by using the approaches
of noise removal and signal separation, k = 1, 2. The following lemma provides a result on the error
probability for this estimation.
Lemma 5. When 1 ≤ α ≤ 3/2, given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (96)-(98), then for almost all
channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, the error probability of estimating vk,c from yk is
Pr[vk,c 6= vˆk,c]→ 0 as P →∞ (101)
for k = 1, 2, where vˆk,c is the corresponding estimate for vk,c based on the observation yk expressed in
(99) and (100).
Proof. In this proof we use the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. The full details are
described in Appendix F.
We will proceed with the lower bound on the secure rate R1 expressed in (38). In this case, given that
v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γ · 1Q , Q = P
α/3−
2 ) and that v1 =
√
P−(α−1)v1,c, the rate of v1 is
H(v1) = H(v1,c) = log(2 · P
α/3−
2 + 1) (102)
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where  can be set as → 0. Then, I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) = H(v1)−H(v1|y1)
≥ H(v1)−
(
1 + Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c}] ·H(v1)
)
=
α/3− 
2
logP + o(logP ) (103)
for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, where (103) follows from (102) and Lemma 5.
On the other hand, by following the steps related to (73)-(76), I(v1; y2|v2) can be bounded as
I(v1; y2|v2) ≤ 1. (104)
Finally, by incorporating (103) and (104) into (38), the secure rate R1 is lower bounded by
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2)
≥ α/3− 
2
logP + o(logP ) (105)
for almost all the channel coefficients. Due to the symmetry, by interchanging the roles of users, it gives
the lower bound on the second secure rate: R2 = I(v2; y2) − I(v2; y1|v1) ≥ α/3−2 logP + o(logP ). By
setting → 0, then the secure GDoF pair (d1 = α/3, d2 = α/3) is achievable by the proposed cooperative
jamming scheme for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, for the case of 1 ≤ α ≤ 3/2.
V. PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We will prove that when 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1, given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (79)-(81), then for
almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2, the error probability of estimating {vk,c, vk,p} from
yk is
Pr[{vk,c 6= vˆk,c} ∪ {vk,p 6= vˆk,p}]→ 0 as P →∞ (106)
for k = 1, 2, where vˆk,c and vˆk,p are the corresponding estimates for vk,c and vk,p, respectively, based on
the observation yk expressed in (82) and (83). In this case, we will use the approaches of noise removal
and signal separation that will be discussed below.
Due to the symmetry we will focus on the proof for the first user (k = 1). At first, we will estimate
three symbols
v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,c ·
1
Q
, Q = P
α/3−
2 )
v2,c + u1 ∈ 2 · Ω(ξ = γv2,c ·
1
Q
, Q = P
α/3−
2 )
u2 ∈ Ω(ξ = γu2 ·
1
Q
, Q = P
α/3−
2 )
simultaneously from y1 by treating the other signals as noise, where y1 is expressed in (82). Note that we
will estimate the sum v2,c + u1 but not the individual symbols v2,c and u1. From y1 expressed in (82), it
can be rewritten as
y1 =
√
Ph11h22v1,c +
√
P 1−αh11h22v1,p +
√
Pαh12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
P 2α−1h12h21u2 + h12h11v2,p + z1
=
√
P 2α−1(h12h21u2 +
√
P 1−αh12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
P 2−2αh11h22v1,c) + z˜1
=
√
P 5α/3−1+ · 2γ · (g0q0 +
√
P 1−αg1q1 +
√
P 2−2αg2q2) + z˜1 (107)
where z˜1,
√
P 1−αh11h22v1,p + h12h11v2,p + z1 and
g0,h12h21, g1,h12h11, g2,h11h22
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q0,
Qmax
2γ
· u2, q1, Qmax
2γ
· (v2,c + u1), q2, Qmax
2γ
· v1,c, Qmax,P
α/3−
2
for a given constant γ ∈ (0, 1
4
√
2
]
(see (35)). Based on our definitions, it holds true that q0, q1, q2 ∈ Z
and |q0| ≤ Qmax, |q1| ≤ 2Qmax, |q2| ≤ Qmax. From the definition in (2), i.e., P ,maxk{22mkk} and√
Pαk` = 2mk` , k, ` = 1, 2, it implies that
√
P 1−α ∈ Z+ and√P 2−2α ∈ Z+ for this case with 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1.
From y1 expressed in (107), q0, q1, q3 can be estimated by using a demodulator, which searches for the
corresponding estimates qˆ0, qˆ1, qˆ3 by minimizing
|y1 −
√
P 5α/3−1+ · 2γ · (g0qˆ0 +
√
P 1−αg1qˆ1 +
√
P 2−2αg2qˆ2)|.
Let us consider the minimum distance between the signals generated by (q0, q1, q2) and (q′0, q
′
1, q
′
2), defined
as
dmin(g0, g1, g2), min
q0,q2,q′0,q
′
2∈Z∩[−Qmax,Qmax]
q1,q′1∈Z∩[−2Qmax,2Qmax]
(q0,q1,q2)6=(q′0,q′1,q′2)
|g0(q0 − q′0) +
√
P 1−αg1(q1 − q′1) +
√
P 2−2αg2(q2 − q′2)|. (108)
The following Lemma 7 shows that, given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (79)-(81), the minimum
distance dmin defined in (108) is sufficiently large for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2
when P is large. Before providing Lemma 7, we will present an existing result from [33], which will be
used in the proof of Lemma 7.
Lemma 6. [33, Lemma 14] Let β ∈ (0, 1], A1, A2 ∈ Z+, and Q0, Q1, Q2 ∈ Z+. Define the event
B′(q0, q1, q2),{(g0, g1, g2) ∈ (1, 4]3 : |g0q0 + A1g1q1 + A2g2q2| < β}
and set
B′,
⋃
q0,q1,q2∈Z:
(q0,q1,q2)6=0,
|qk|≤Qk ∀k
B′(q0, q1, q2).
Then the Lebesgue measure of B′, denoted by L(B′), is bounded by
L(B′) ≤ 504β
(
2 min
{
Q2,
Q0
A2
}
+ min
{
Q1Q˜2,
Q0Q˜2
A1
,
A2Q˜2Q˜2
A1
}
+2 min
{
Q1,
Q0
A1
}
+ min
{
Q2Q˜1,
Q0Q˜1
A2
,
A1Q˜1Q˜1
A2
})
where
Q˜1,min
{
Q1, 8 · max{Q0, A2Q2}
A1
}
Q˜2,min
{
Q2, 8 · max{Q0, A1Q1}
A2
}
.
Lemma 7. Consider the case α ∈ [3/4, 1], and consider some constants δ ∈ (0, 1] and  > 0. Given the
signal design in (32)-(34) and (79)-(81), then the minimum distance dmin defined in (108) is bounded by
dmin ≥ δP−
8α/3−2
2 (109)
for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 \ Hout, and the Lebesgue measure of the outage set
Hout ⊆ (1, 2]2×2 , denoted by L(Hout), satisfies
L(Hout) ≤ 258048δ · P− 2 . (110)
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Proof. We consider the case of 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1. Let
β, δP−
8α/3−2
2 , A1,P
1−α
2 , A2,P 1−α
g0,h12h21, g1,h12h11, g2,h11h22
Q0, 2Qmax, Q1, 4Qmax, Q2, 2Qmax, Qmax,P
α/3−
2
for some  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Let us define the event
B(q0, q1, q2),{(g0, g1, g2) ∈ (1, 4]3 : |g0q0 + A1g1q1 + A2g2q2| < β} (111)
and set
B,
⋃
q0,q1,q2∈Z:
(q0,q1,q2)6=0,
|qk|≤Qk ∀k
B(q0, q1, q2). (112)
From Lemma 6, the Lebesgue measure of B, denoted by L(B), is bounded by
L(B) ≤ 504β
(
2 min
{
2Qmax,
2Qmax
P 1−α
}
+ Q˜2 ·min
{
4Qmax,
2Qmax
P
1−α
2
,
P 1−αQ˜2
P
1−α
2
}
+ 2 min
{
4Qmax,
2Qmax
P
1−α
2
}
+ Q˜1 ·min
{
2Qmax,
2Qmax
P 1−α
,
P
1−α
2 · 4Qmax
P 1−α
})
= 504β
(4Qmax
P 1−α
+ Q˜2 · 2Qmax
P
1−α
2
+
4Qmax
P
1−α
2
+ Q˜1 · 2Qmax
P 1−α
)
= 504β
(4Qmax
P 1−α
+ 2Qmax ·min{1, 16P− 1−α2 } · 2Qmax
P
1−α
2
+
4Qmax
P
1−α
2
+ 4Qmax · 2Qmax
P 1−α
)
≤ 504β
(4Qmax
P 1−α
+ 2Qmax · 16 · 2Qmax
P 1−α
+
4Qmax
P
1−α
2
+ 4Qmax · 2Qmax
P 1−α
)
≤ 504β · 16Qmax
P
1−α
2
·max{16Qmax
P
1−α
2
, 1}
= 504β · 16P 4α/3−1−2 ·max{16P 4α/3−1−2 , 1}
≤ 504β · 16P 4α/3−1−2 · 16P 4α/3−12
= 504δP−
8α/3−2
2 · 16P 4α/3−1−2 · 16P 4α/3−12
= 129024δ · P− 2 (113)
for a constant δ ∈ (0, 1], where
Q˜1 = min
{
4Qmax, 8 · max{2Qmax, P
1−α · 2Qmax}
P
1−α
2
}
= min
{
4Qmax, 8P
1−α
2 · 2Qmax
}
= 4Qmax
Q˜2,min
{
2Qmax, 8 · max{2Qmax, P
1−α
2 · 4Qmax}
P 1−α
}
= 2Qmax ·min{1, 16P− 1−α2 }.
The set B defined in (112) is the collection of (g0, g1, g2) ∈ (1, 4]3, and for any (g0, g1, g2) ∈ B there
exists at least one triple (q0, q1, q2) ∈ {q0, q1, q2 : q0, q1, q2 ∈ Z, (q0, q1, q2) 6= 0, |qk| ≤ Qk ∀k}, such that
|g0q0 + A1g1q1 + A2g2q2| < δP− 8α/3−22 . Therefore, B can be considered as an outage set. For any triple
(g0, g1, g2) outside the outage set B, i.e., (g0, g1, g2) /∈ B, it is apparent that dmin(g0, g1, g2) ≥ δP− 8α/3−22 .
In our setting g0,h12h21, g1,h12h11, g2,h11h22. Let us define Hout as the collection of the quadruples
(h11, h12, h22, h21) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 such that the corresponding triples (g0, g1, g2) are in the outage set B, that
is,
Hout,{(h11, h12, h22, h21) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 : (g0, g1, g2) ∈ B}.
19
In the second step, the goal is to bound the Lebesgue measure of Hout:
L(Hout) =
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h22=1
1Hout(h11, h12, h22, h21)dh22dh21dh12dh11 (114)
=
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h22=1
1B(h12h21, h12h11, h11h22)dh22dh21dh12dh11
≤
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 4
g2=1
∫ 4
g1=1
∫ 4
g0=1
1B(g0, g1, g2)g
−1
1 h
−1
11 dg0dg1dg2dh11
≤
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 4
g2=1
∫ 4
g1=1
∫ 4
g0=1
1B(g0, g1, g2)dg0dg1dg2dh11
=
∫ 2
h11=1
L(B)dh11
≤
∫ 2
h11=1
129024δ · P− 2dh11 (115)
= 258048δ · P− 2 (116)
where 1Hout(h11, h12, h22, h21) = 1 if (h11, h12, h22, h21) ∈ Hout, else 1Hout(h11, h12, h22, h21) = 0; similarly,
1B(g0, g1, g2) = 1 if (g0, g1, g2) ∈ B, else 1B(g0, g1, g2) = 0; and (115) follows from the result in (113).
Note that the approach on bounding L(Hout) in the second step has been previously used in [33]. At this
point we complete the proof of this lemma.
Lemma 7 shows that, when 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1, and given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (79)-(81),
the minimum distance dmin defined in (108) is sufficiently large for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈
(1, 2]2×2 except for an outage set Hout ⊆ (1, 2]2×2 with Lebesgue measure L(Hout) satisfying
L(Hout)→ 0, as P →∞
(see (116)). In what follows, we will consider the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 that are not in the
an outage set Hout. Under this channel condition, the minimum distance dmin defined in (108) is bounded
by dmin ≥ δP− 8α/3−22 (see (109) in Lemma 7) for a given constant δ ∈ (0, 1].
At this point, we go back to the expression of y1 in (107) and decode the sum
xs, g0q0 +
√
P 1−αg1q1 +
√
P 2−2αg2q2
by treating other signals as noise (noise removal). Once xs is decoded correctly, then q0, q1, q2 can be
recovered due to the fact that g0, g1, g2 are rationally independent (signal separation, cf. [35]). Note that
y1 expressed in (107) can also be rewritten as
y1 =
√
P 5α/3−1+ · 2γ (g0q0 +
√
P 1−αg1q1 +
√
P 2−2αg2q2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,xs
+
√
P 1−α
(
h11h22v1,p +
1√
P 1−α
h12h11v2,p
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
, g˜
+z1
=
√
P 5α/3−1+ · 2γ · xs +
√
P 1−αg˜ + z1 (117)
where g˜,h11h22v1,p + 1√P 1−αh12h11v2,p and
|g˜| ≤ g˜max,
√
2 ∀g˜
for this case of 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1, and given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (79)-(81). Based on our
definition, the minimum distance for xs is dmin defined in (108). Lemma 7 reveals that, under the channel
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condition {hk`} /∈ Hout, the minimum distance for xs is bounded by dmin ≥ δP− 8α/3−22 . For this channel
model in (117), the probability of error for decoding xs from y1 is
Pr[xs 6= xˆs]
≤ Pr
[
|z1 + P 1−α2 g˜| > P
5α/3−1+
2 · 2γ · dmin
2
]
= Pr[z1 > P
5α/3−1+
2 · 2γ · dmin
2
− P 1−α2 g˜] + Pr[z1 > P
5α/3−1+
2 · 2γ · dmin
2
+ P
1−α
2 g˜] (118)
≤ Pr[z1 > P
5α/3−1+
2 · 2γ · dmin
2
− P 1−α2 g˜max] + Pr[z1 > P
5α/3−1+
2 · 2γ · dmin
2
− P 1−α2 g˜max] (119)
= 2 ·Q(P 5α/3−1+2 · 2γ · dmin
2
− P 1−α2 g˜max
)
≤ 2 ·Q(P 1−α2 (γδP 2 −√2)) (120)
where xˆs is the estimate for xs by choosing the point close to xs, based on the observation y; dmin
is defined in (108); δ ∈ (0, 1] and γ ∈ (0, 1
4
√
2
]
are two constants; (118) follows from the fact that
1 − Q(a) = Q(−a) for any a ∈ R, where the Q-function is defined as Q(a), 1√
2pi
∫∞
a
exp(− s2
2
)ds;
(119) uses the fact that |g˜| ≤ g˜max,
√
2, ∀g˜; (120) follows from the result that dmin ≥ δP− 8α/3−22 (see
Lemma 7). When γδP

2 −√2 ≥ 0, the error probability Pr[xs 6= xˆs] can be further bounded as
Pr[xs 6= xˆs] ≤ exp
(
−P
1−α(γδP 2 −√2)2
2
)
by using the identity that Q(a) ≤ 1
2
exp(−a2/2), ∀a ≥ 0. At this point, we can conclude that the error
probability for decoding xs from y1 is
Pr[xs 6= xˆs]→ 0 as P →∞. (121)
Once xs is decoded correctly, then the three symbols q0 = Qmax2γ ·u2, q1 = Qmax2γ ·(v2,c+u1) and q2 = Qmax2γ ·v1,c
can be recovered from xs = g0q0 +
√
P 1−αg1q1 +
√
P 2−2αg2q2 due to the fact that g0, g1, g2 are rationally
independent.
In the next step, we remove the decoded xs from y1 (see (117)) and then decode v1,p from the following
observation
y1 −
√
P 5α/3−1+ · 2γ · xs =
√
P 1−αh11h22v1,p + h12h11v2,p + z1.
Note that v1,p, v2,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γ · 1Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ) and h12h11v2,p ≤ 1√2 . Then, from Lemma 1 (see
Section IV) we conclude that the error probability for decoding v1,p is
Pr[v1,p 6= vˆ1,p]→ 0 as P →∞. (122)
By combining the results in (121) and (122), as well as the fact that v1,c can be recovered from xs, we
conclude that the error probability of estimating {vk,c, vk,p} from yk is
Pr[{vk,c 6= vˆk,c} ∪ {vk,p 6= vˆk,p}]→ 0 as P →∞ (123)
for k = 1 and 3/4 ≤ α ≤ 1, given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (79)-(81). This result holds true
for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 except for an outage set Hout ⊆ (1, 2]2×2 with Lebesgue
measure L(Hout) satisfying
L(Hout)→ 0, as P →∞
(see (116)). Due to the symmetry, the result in (123) also holds true for the case of k = 2. At this point,
we complete the proof.
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VI. CONVERSE
For the Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, we provide an outer bound on the secure
capacity region, which is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. For the two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, the secure capacity
region is bounded by
R1 +R2 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 + Pα22−α12 · |h22|
2
|h12|2 + P
α21−(α11−α12)+ · |h21|
2
|h11|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−α21 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α22−α21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+ log 10 (124)
2R1 +R2 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1+
P (α11−α21)
+
|h21|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1+
P (α22−α12)
+
|h12|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1+Pα11|h11|2+Pα12|h12|2
)
+log 9
(125)
2R2 +R1 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1+
P (α22−α12)
+
|h12|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1+
P (α11−α21)
+
|h12|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1+Pα22|h22|2+Pα21|h21|2
)
+log 9
(126)
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−α21 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α22+α11−α21 · |h11|
2|h22|2
|h21|2
)
(127)
R2 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 + Pα22−α12 · |h22|
2
|h12|2 + P
α11+α22−α12 · |h22|
2|h11|2
|h12|2
)
(128)
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11 · |h11|2
)
(129)
R2 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 + Pα22 · |h22|2
)
. (130)
Before providing the proof of Lemma 8, let us provide a result on the secure sum GDoF derived from
Lemma 8.
Corollary 1 (Secure sum GDoF). For the two-user Gaussian interference channel, the secure sum GDoF
is upper bounded by
dsum ≤ (α11 − (α21 − α22)+)+ + (α22 − (α12 − α11)+)+ (131)
dsum ≤ max{α21 − (α11 − α12)+, α22 − α12, 0}+ max{α12 − (α22 − α21)+, α11 − α21, 0} (132)
dsum ≤ 1
3
(
max{α11, α12}+ (α11 − α21)+ + (α22 − α12)+
+ max{α22, α21}+ (α11 − α21)+ + (α22 − α12)+
)
. (133)
Proof. The proof is based on the result of Lemma 8, by focusing on the secure sum GDoF measurement.
Specifically, (131) results from (127)-(130); (132) stems from (124); while (133) follows from the
combination of (125) and (126).
Note that, for the symmetric case with α11 = α22 = 1 and α21 = α12 = α, the secure sum GDoF bound
described in Corollary 1 is simplified as
dsum ≤ 2 ·min
{
max{α− (1− α)+, 1− α}, (1− (α− 1)+)+, max{1, α}+ 2(1− α)
+
3
}
which serves as the converse of Theorem 1. In the following we will provide the proof of Lemma 8.
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A. Proof of bound (124)
Let us now prove bound (124) in Lemma 8. At first we define that
skk(t),
√
P (αkk−αk`)+hkkxk(t) + z˜k(t) (134)
s`k(t),
√
Pα`kh`kxk(t) + z`(t), (135)
for k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= `, where z˜k(t) ∼ N (0, 1) is a virtual noise that is independent of the other noise
and transmitted signals. Let snkk,{skk(t)}nt=1 and sn`k,{s`k(t)}nt=1. We begin with the rate of user 1:
nR1 = H(w1)
= I(w1; yn1 ) +H(w1|yn1 )
≤ I(w1; yn1 ) + n1,n (136)
≤ I(w1; yn1 )− I(w1; yn2 ) + n1,n + n (137)
where (136) follows from Fano’s inequality, limn→∞ 1,n = 0; (137) results from the secrecy constraint,
i.e., I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n for an arbitrary small . Similarly, for the rate of user 2 we have
nR2 ≤ I(w2; yn2 )− I(w2; yn1 ) + n2,n + n (138)
which, together with (137), gives the following bound on the sum rate:
nR1 + nR2 − n1,n − n2,n − 2n
≤I(w1; yn1 )− I(w1; yn2 ) + I(w2; yn2 )− I(w2; yn1 )
=h(yn1 )− h(yn1 |w1)− h(yn2 ) + h(yn2 |w1) + h(yn2 )− h(yn2 |w2)− h(yn1 ) + h(yn1 |w2)
=h(yn2 |w1)− h(yn1 |w1) + h(yn1 |w2)− h(yn2 |w2). (139)
To bound the right-hand side of (139), we provide the following lemma.
Lemma 9. For y1(t) and y2(t) expressed in (3), we have
h(yn2 |w1)− h(yn1 |w1) ≤
n
2
log
(
1 + Pα22−α12 · |h22|
2
|h12|2 + P
α21−(α11−α12)+ · |h21|
2
|h11|2
)
+
n
2
log 10 (140)
h(yn1 |w2)− h(yn2 |w2) ≤
n
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−α21 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α22−α21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+
n
2
log 10. (141)
Proof. Let us first prove the bound in (140):
h(yn2 |w1)− h(yn1 |w1)
=h(sn11, y
n
2 |w1)− h(sn11|yn2 , w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J1
−h(sn11, yn1 |w1) + h(sn11|yn1 , w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J2
(142)
=h(yn2 |sn11, w1)− h(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2
=h(sn12, y
n
2 |sn11, w1)− h(sn12|yn2 , sn11, w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J3
−h(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2
=h(sn12|sn11, w1) + h(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J4
−h(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 (143)
=h(yn1 |xn1 , sn11, w1)− h(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (144)
=− I(yn1 ;xn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (145)
23
where J1, h(sn11|yn2 , w1), J2, h(sn11|yn1 , w1), J3, h(sn12|yn2 , sn11, w1) and J4, h(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1); the steps
from (142) to (143) follow from chain rule; (144) stems from that
h(sn12|sn11, w1)
=h(sn12) (146)
=h(sn12|xn1 , sn11, w1) (147)
=h({
√
Pα12h12x2(t) + z1(t)}nt=1|xn1 , sn11, w1)
=h({
√
Pα11h11x1(t) +
√
Pα12h12x2(t) + z1(t)}nt=1|xn1 , sn11, w1) (148)
=h(yn1 |xn1 , sn11, w1)
where (146) and (147) use the fact that sn12 is independent of s
n
11, w1 and x
n
1 ; (148) follows from that
h(a|b) = h(a+ b|b) for any continuous random variables a and b. Going back to (145), we further have
h(yn2 |w1)− h(yn1 |w1)
= −I(yn1 ;xn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (149)
≤ −J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (150)
≤ n
2
log
(
1 + Pα22−α12 · |h22|
2
|h12|2 + P
α21−(α11−α12)+ · |h21|
2
|h11|2
)
+
n
2
log 10 (151)
where (149) is from (145); (150) stems from the nonnegativity of mutual information; (151) follows from
Lemma 10 (see below). Similarly, by interchanging the roles of user 1 and user 2, we also have
h(yn1 |w2)− h(yn2 |w2) ≤
n
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−α21 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α22−α21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+
n
2
log 10. (152)
Lemma 10. For J1 = h(sn11|yn2 , w1), J2 = h(sn11|yn1 , w1), J3 = h(sn12|yn2 , sn11, w1) and J4 =
h(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1), we have
J1 ≥ n
2
log(2pie) (153)
J3 ≥ n
2
log(2pie) (154)
J2 ≤ n
2
log(20pie) (155)
J4 ≤ n
2
log
(
2pie
(
1 + Pα22−α12 · |h22|
2
|h12|2 + P
α21−(α11−α12)+ · |h21|
2
|h11|2
))
. (156)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Finally, by incorporating the results (140) and (141) of Lemma 9 into (139), it gives the following
bound on the sum rate
R1 +R2 − 1,n − 2,n − 2
≤1
2
log
(
1 + Pα22−α12 · |h22|
2
|h12|2 + P
α21−(α11−α12)+ · |h21|
2
|h11|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−α21 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α22−α21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+ log 10. (157)
By setting n→∞, 1,n → 0, 2,n → 0 and → 0, we get the desired bound (124).
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B. Proof of bounds (127) and (128)
Let us now prove bound (127). Beginning with Fano’s inequality, we can bound the rate of user 1 as:
nR1 ≤ I(w1; yn1 ) + n1,n
≤ I(w1; {
√
Pα11h11x1(t) + z1(t)}nt=1) + n1,n (158)
≤ I(w1; {
√
Pα11h11x1(t) + z1(t)}nt=1, yn2 ) + n1,n (159)
≤ I(w1; {
√
Pα11h11x1(t) + z1(t)}nt=1, yn2 )− I(w1; yn2 ) + n+ n1,n (160)
= I(w1; {
√
Pα11h11x1(t) + z1(t)}nt=1|yn2 ) + n+ n1,n
= I(w1; {
√
Pα11h11x1(t) + z1(t)}nt=1|{y¯2(t)}nt=1) + n+ n1,n (161)
= I(w1; {y¯2(t)−
√
Pα11h11x1(t)− z1(t)}nt=1|{y¯2(t)}nt=1) + n+ n1,n
= I(w1; {
√
Pα22+α11−α21
h11h22
h21
x2(t) +
√
Pα11−α21
h11
h21
z2(t)− z1(t)}nt=1|{y¯2(t)}nt=1) + n+ n1,n
≤ n
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−α21 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α22+α11−α21 · |h11|
2|h22|2
|h21|2
)
+ n+ n1,n (162)
where limn→∞ 1,n = 0; (158) stems from the Markov chain of w1 → {
√
Pα11h11x1(t) + z1(t)}nt=1 → yn1 ;
(159) results from the fact that adding information does not decrease the mutual information; (160) results
from the secrecy constraint, i.e., I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n for an arbitrary small  (cf. (5)); (161) uses the definition
that
y¯2(t),
√
Pα11−α21
h11
h21
y2(t) =
√
Pα11h11x1(t) +
√
Pα22+α11−α21
h11h22
h21
x2(t) +
√
Pα11−α21
h11
h21
z2(t);
(162) follows from the fact that I(w1; {
√
Pα22+α11−α21 h11h22
h21
x2(t) +
√
Pα11−α21 h11
h21
z2(t) −
z1(t)}nt=1|{y¯2(t)}nt=1) ≤
∑
t h(
√
Pα22+α11−α21 h11h22
h21
x2(t) +
√
Pα11−α21 h11
h21
z2(t)− z1(t))−
∑
t h(z1(t)) and
the fact that Gaussian input maximizes the differential entropy. Letting n → ∞, 1,n → 0 and  → 0,
it gives bound (127). By interchanging the roles of user 1 and user 2, bound (128) can be proved in a
similar way.
C. Proof of bounds (129) and (130)
By following from (158), we have
nR1 − n1,n ≤ I(w1; {
√
Pα11h11x1(t) + z1(t)}nt=1) + n1,n
≤ n
2
log
(
1 + Pα11 · |h11|2
)
(163)
which gives the bound in (129). The bound in (130) can be proved in a similar way by interchanging the
roles of user 1 and user 2.
D. Proof of bounds (125) and (126)
Let us now prove bound (125). Let
x˜k(t),
√
Pmax{αkk,α`k}xk(t) + z˜k(t)
and x˜nk ,{x˜k(t)}nt=1 for k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= `, where z˜k(t) ∼ N (0, 1) is a virtual noise that is independent
of the other noise and transmitted signals. Recall that
s`k(t),
√
Pα`kh`kxk(t) + z`(t)
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for k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= ` (cf. (135)) Beginning with Fano’s inequality, the secure rate of user 1 is bounded
as:
nR1 − n1,n
≤ I(w1; yn1 )
≤ I(w1; yn1 )− I(w1; yn2 ) + n (164)
≤ I(w1; yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 , yn2 )− I(w1; yn2 ) + n (165)
= I(w1; yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 |yn2 ) + n
= h(yn1 , x˜
n
1 , x˜
n
2 |yn2 )− h(yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 |yn2 , w1) + n
= h(yn1 , y
n
2 , x˜
n
1 , x˜
n
2 )− h(yn2 )− h(yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 |yn2 , w1) + n
= h(x˜n1 , x˜
n
2 )− h(yn2 ) + h(yn1 , yn2 |x˜n1 , x˜n2 )− h(yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 |yn2 , w1) + n (166)
where (164) results from a secrecy constraint (cf. (5)); (165) stems from the fact that adding information
does not decrease the mutual information; On the other hand, we have
nR1 ≤ I(w1; yn1 ) + n1,n
≤ I(xn1 ; yn1 ) + n1,n (167)
= h(yn1 )− h(yn1 |xn1 ) + n1,n
= h(yn1 )− h(sn12|xn1 ) + n1,n (168)
= h(yn1 )− h(sn12) + n1,n (169)
where (167) follows from the Markov chain of w1 → xn1 → yn1 ; (168) results from the fact that y1(t) =√
Pα11h11x1(t) + s12(t); (169) follows from the independence between xn1 and s
n
12. In a similar way, we
have
nR2 ≤ h(yn2 )− h(sn21) + n2,n. (170)
Finally, by combining (166), (169) and (170), it gives
2nR1 + nR2 − 2n1,n − n2,n − n
≤ h(x˜n1 )− h(sn21) + h(x˜n2 )− h(sn12) + h(yn1 ) + h(yn1 , yn2 |x˜n1 , x˜n2 )− h(yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 |yn2 , w1)
≤ h(x˜n1 )− h(sn21) + h(x˜n2 )− h(sn12) + h(yn1 ) + h(yn1 , yn2 |x˜n1 , x˜n2 )−
3n
2
log(2pie) (171)
≤ h(x˜n1 )− h(sn21) + h(x˜n2 )− h(sn12) +
n
2
log
(
1 + Pα11|h11|2 + Pα12|h12|2
)
+ h(yn1 , y
n
2 |x˜n1 , x˜n2 )−
2n
2
log(2pie) (172)
≤ h(x˜n1 )− h(sn21) + h(x˜n2 )− h(sn12) +
n
2
log
(
1 + Pα11|h11|2 + Pα12|h12|2
)
+ n log 9 (173)
where (171) follows from the derivation that h(yn1 , x˜
n
1 , x˜
n
2 |yn2 , w1) ≥ h(yn1 , x˜n1 , x˜n2 |yn2 , w1, xn1 , xn2 ) =
h(zn1 , z˜
n
1 , z˜
n
2 ) =
3n
2
log(2pie); (172) holds true because h(yn1 ) ≤ n2 log
(
2pie(1 + Pα11|h11|2 + Pα12|h12|2)
)
;
(173) uses the fact that
h(yn1 , y
n
2 |x˜n1 , x˜n2 )
=h
({y1(t)− P α11−max{α11,α21}2 h11x˜1(t)− P α12−max{α22,α12}2 h12x˜2(t)}nt=1,
{y2(t)− P
α22−max{α22,α12}
2 h22x˜2(t)− P
α21−max{α11,α21}
2 h21x˜1(t)}nt=1|x˜n1 , x˜n2
)
≤
n∑
t=1
h
(
z1(t)− P
α11−max{α11,α21}
2 h11z˜1(t)− P
α12−max{α22,α12}
2 h12z˜2(t)
)
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+
n∑
t=1
h
(
z2(t)− P
α22−max{α22,α12}
2 h22z˜2(t)− P
α21−max{α11,α21}
2 h21z˜1(t)
)
≤n
2
log
(
2pi
(
1 + Pα11−max{α11,α21}|h11|2 + Pα12−max{α22,α12}|h12|2
))
+
n
2
log
(
2pi
(
1 + Pα22−max{α22,α12}|h22|2 + Pα21−max{α11,α21}|h21|2
))
≤n
2
log(2pi × 9) + n
2
log(2pi × 9). (174)
Let us focus on h(x˜n1 )− h(sn21) in the right-hand side of (173):
h(x˜n1 )− h(sn21) =h(x˜n1 )− h(z˜n1 ) + h(zn2 )− h(sn21)
=I(x˜n1 ;xn1 )− I(sn21;xn1 )
≤I(x˜n1 ;xn1 |sn21)
=h(x˜n1 |sn21)− h(x˜n1 |xn1 , sn21)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h(z˜n1 )
=h(x˜n1 |sn21)−
n
2
log(2pie)
≤
n∑
t=1
h(x˜1(t)|s21(t))− n
2
log(2pie)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
x˜1(t)− P
max{α11,α21}−α21
2
s21(t)
h21
∣∣s21(t))− n
2
log(2pie)
≤
n∑
t=1
h
(
z˜1(t)− P
max{α11,α21}−α21
2
z2(t)
h21
)
− n
2
log(2pie)
=
n
2
log
(
1 + P (α11−α21)
+ · 1|h21|2
)
. (175)
Similarly, we have
h(x˜n2 )− h(sn12) ≤
n
2
log
(
1 + P (α22−α12)
+ · 1|h12|2
)
. (176)
At this point, by incorporating (175) and (176) into (173), it gives
2R1 +R2 − 21,n − 2,n − 
≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
P (α11−α21)
+
|h21|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
P (α22−α12)
+
|h12|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11|h11|2 + Pα12|h12|2
)
+ log 9.
By setting n→∞, 1,n, 2,n → 0 and → 0, it gives bound (125). By interchanging the roles of user 1
and user 2, bound (126) can be proved in a similar way.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work considered the two-user Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages. For
the symmetric setting, this work completed the optimal secure sum GDoF characterization for all the
interference regimes. For the general setting, this work showed that a simple scheme without cooperative
jamming (i.e., GWC-TIN scheme) can achieve the secure sum capacity to within a constant gap, when
the conditions of (20) and (21) are satisfied. In this GWC-TIN scheme, each transmitter uses a Gaussian
wiretap codebook, while each receiver treats interference as noise when decoding the desired message.
For the symmetric case, this simple scheme is optimal when the interference-to-signal ratio α is no more
than 2/3. However, when the ratio α is more than 2/3, we showed that this simple scheme is not optimal
27
anymore and a scheme with cooperative jamming is proposed to achieve the optimal secure sum GDoF.
In the future work we will try to understand when it is necessary to use cooperative jamming and when
it is not, for the secure communication over the other networks.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 10
Remind that J1 = h(sn11|yn2 , w1), J2 = h(sn11|yn1 , w1), J3 = h(sn12|yn2 , sn11, w1), J4 = h(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1),
s11(t) =
√
P (α11−α12)+h11x1(t)+ z˜1(t), and s12(t) =
√
Pα12h12x2(t)+z1(t). At first we focus on the lower
bound of J1:
J1 = h(s
n
11|yn2 , w1)
≥ h(sn11|xn1 , yn2 , w1) (177)
= h({
√
P (α11−α12)+h11x1(t) + z˜1(t)}nt=1|xn1 , yn2 , w1)
= h({z˜1(t)}nt=1|xn1 , yn2 , w1) (178)
= h({z˜1(t)}nt=1)
=
n
2
log(2pie)
where (177) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (178) follows from the
fact that h(a|b) = h(a − b|b) for any continuous random variables a and b; the last equality holds true
because h(z˜1(t)) = 12 log(2pie). Similarly, we have
J3 = h(s
n
12|yn2 , sn11, w1)
≥ h(sn12|xn2 , yn2 , sn11, w1)
= h({z1(t)}nt=1)
=
n
2
log(2pie).
Now we focus on the upper bound of J2:
J2 =h(s
n
11|yn1 , w1)
=
n∑
t=1
h(s11(t)|st−111 , yn1 , w1) (179)
≤
n∑
t=1
h(s11(t)|y1(t)) (180)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
s11(t)−
√
P−α12y1(t)|y1(t)
)
(181)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
z˜1(t) + (
√
P (α11−α12)+ −
√
Pα11−α12)h11x1(t)− h12x2(t)−
√
P−α12z1(t)
∣∣y1(t))
≤
n∑
t=1
h
(
z˜1(t) + (
√
P (α11−α12)+ −
√
Pα11−α12)h11x1(t)− h12x2(t)−
√
P−α12z1(t)
)
(182)
≤n
2
log(2pie(1 + (
√
P (α11−α12)+ −
√
Pα11−α12)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
· |h11|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤4
+ |h12|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤4
+P−α12︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
)) (183)
≤n
2
log(20pie) (184)
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where (179) results from chain rule; (180) and (182) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces
differential entropy; (181) uses the fact that h(a|b) = h(a − βb|b) for a constant β; (183) follows from
the fact that h
(
z˜1(t) + β0x1(t)− β1x2(t)− β2z1(t)
) ≤ 1
2
log(2pie(1 + β20 + β
2
1 + β
2
2)) for constants β0, β1
and β2; (184) uses the identities 0 ≤
√
P (α11−α12)+ −√Pα11−α12 ≤ 1 and P−α12 ≤ 1. Recall that P ≥ 1
and αk` ≥ 0, hk` ∈ (1, 2],∀k, ` ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly, we have the following bound on J4:
J4 = h(y
n
2 |sn12, sn11, w1)
=
n∑
t=1
h(y2(t)|yt−12 , sn12, sn11, w1) (185)
≤
n∑
t=1
h(y2(t)|s12(t), s11(t)) (186)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
y2(t)−
√
Pα22−α12
h22
h12
s12(t)−
√
Pα21−(α11−α12)+
h21
h11
s11(t)|s12(t), s11(t)
)
(187)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
z2(t)−
√
Pα22−α12
h22
h12
z1(t)−
√
Pα21−(α11−α12)+
h21
h11
z˜1(t)
∣∣s12(t), s11(t))
≤
n∑
t=1
h
(
z2(t)−
√
Pα22−α12
h22
h12
z1(t)−
√
Pα21−(α11−α12)+
h21
h11
z˜1(t)
)
(188)
≤ n
2
log
(
2pie
(
1 + Pα22−α12 · |h22|
2
|h12|2 + P
α21−(α11−α12)+ · |h21|
2
|h11|2
))
where (185) results from chain rule; (186) and (188) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces
differential entropy; (187) uses the fact that h(a|b, c) = h(a − β1b − β2c|b, c) for constants β1 and β2;
the last inequality stems from the fact that h
(
z2(t) − β3z1(t) − β4z˜1(t)
) ≤ 1
2
log(2pie(1 + β23 + β
2
4)) for
constants β3 and β4. At this point we complete the proof.
APPENDIX B
THE GAP BETWEEN SECURE SUM CAPACITY UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS FOR THEOREM 2
As discussed in Section II-B, the GWC-TIN scheme achieves the secure sum capacity lower bound
C lbsum,
1
2
log
(
1 +
|h11|2Pα11−α21
1 + |h12|2
)− 1
2
log(1 + |h21|2) + 1
2
log
(
1 +
|h22|2Pα22−α12
1 + |h21|2
)− 1
2
log(1 + |h12|2)
(see (16) and (17)). In Lemma 8 (see Section VI), we provide a secure sum capacity upper bound in
(124), that is,
Csum ≤ Cubsum,
1
2
log
(
1 + Pα22−α12 · |h22|
2
|h12|2 + P
α21−(α11−α12)+ · |h21|
2
|h11|2
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 + Pα11−α21 · |h11|
2
|h21|2 + P
α12−(α22−α21)+ · |h12|
2
|h22|2
)
+ log 10.
If the following two conditions are satisfied,
α22 + (α11 − α12)+ ≥ α21 + α12 (189)
α11 + (α22 − α21)+ ≥ α21 + α12 (190)
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(see (20) and (21)), then the gap between Cubsum and C
lb
sum is bounded by
Cubsum − C lbsum
≤1
2
log
(
1 + 4Pα22−α12 + 4Pα21−(α11−α12)
+)
+
1
2
log
(
1 + 4Pα11−α21 + 4Pα12−(α22−α21)
+)
+ log 10
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
Pα11−α21
5
)− 1
2
log
(
1 +
Pα22−α12
5
)
+ log 5 (191)
≤1
2
log
(1 + 8Pα22−α12
1 + 1
5
Pα22−α12
)
+
1
2
log
(1 + 8Pα11−α21
1 + 1
5
Pα11−α21
)
+ log 50 (192)
≤ log 40 + log 50 (193)
≤11 (194)
where (191) uses the fact that hk` ∈ (1, 2],∀k, ` ∈ {1, 2}; (192) follows from the conditions in (189) and
(190); (193) results from the identity that 1+a1b
1+a2b
≤ a1
a2
for any positive numbers a1, a2 and b such that
a1 ≥ 1 ≥ a2 > 0. Recall that P ≥ 1 and αk` ≥ 0,∀k, ` ∈ {1, 2}. Note that, the gap can be further reduced
by optimizing the computations in the converse and achievability.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
This section provides the proof of Lemma 1 (see Section IV). Recall that we consider the communication
of x over a channel model given in (25), that is,
y =
√
Pα1hx+
√
Pα2g + z
where x ∈ Ω(ξ,Q) and g ∈ Sg is a discrete random variable such that |g| ≤ gmax, ∀g ∈ Sg, where gmax is
a positive and finite constant independent of P . The minimum distance of the constellation for
√
Pα1hx
is dmin(
√
Pα1hx) =
√
Pα1h · ξ. For this channel model, the probability of error for decoding x from y is
Pr(e) = Pr[x 6= xˆ]
=
Q∑
i=−Q
Pr[x = ξ · i] · Pr[x 6= xˆ|x = ξ · i]
≤
Q∑
i=−Q
Pr[x = ξ · i] ·
(
Pr[z < −P α22 g − dmin/2] + Pr[z > −P
α2
2 g + dmin/2]
)
= Pr[z > P
α2
2 g + dmin/2] + Pr[z > −P
α2
2 g + dmin/2] (195)
≤ Pr[z > P α22 g + dmin/2 | g = −gmax] + Pr[z > −P
α2
2 g + dmin/2 | g = gmax] (196)
= 2 ·Q(dmin/2− P α22 gmax
σ
)
(197)
where xˆ is the estimate for x by choosing the closest point in Ω(ξ,Q), based on the observation y;
(195) follows from the fact that 1−Q(a) = Q(−a) for any a ∈ R, where the Q-function is defined as
Q(a), 1√
2pi
∫∞
a
exp(− s2
2
)ds. When dmin/2 ≥ P
α2
2 gmax, the error probability can be further bounded as
Pr(e) ≤ exp
(
−(dmin/2− P
α2
2 gmax)
2
2σ2
)
,
by using the identity that Q(a) ≤ 1
2
exp(−a2/2), ∀a ≥ 0. At this point, for the case of α1 − α2 > 0, by
setting Q and ξ such that
Q =
P
α¯
2 · hγ
2gmax
, ξ = γ · 1
Q
, ∀α¯ ∈ (0, α1 − α2)
30
where γ ∈ (0, 1/√2] is a constant independent of P , then it holds true that dmin/2 > P
α2
2 gmax and the
probability of error for decoding a symbol x from y is
Pr(e)→ 0 as P →∞.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We will prove that when 2/3 < α ≤ 3/4, given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (40)-(42), the error
probability of estimating {vk,c, vk,p} from yk is
Pr[{vk,c 6= vˆk,c} ∪ {vk,p 6= vˆk,p}]→ 0 as P →∞
for k = 1, 2, where vˆk,c and vˆk,p are the corresponding estimates for vk,c and vk,p, respectively, based on
the observation yk expressed in (43) and (44).
Due to the symmetry we will focus on the proof for the first user (k = 1). In the first step, we estimate
v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,c · 1Q , Q = P
3α−2−
2 ) from y1 by treating the other signals as noise, where y1 is expressed
in (43). Note that y1 in (43) can be rewritten as
y1 =
√
Ph11h22v1,c +
√
Pαg + z1 (198)
where
g,h12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
P−(1−α)h12h21u2 +
√
P−(2α−1)h11h22v1,p +
√
P−αh12h11v2,p.
It holds true that
|g| ≤ 5
√
2
for any realizations of g, given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (40)-(42), under the regime of 2/3 <
α ≤ 3/4. Then, from Lemma 1 we can conclude that the error probability of estimating v1,c from y1 is
Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0, as P →∞. (199)
In the second step, we remove the decoded v1,c from y1 and then estimate v2,c + u1 ∈ 2 · Ω(ξ =
γv2,c · 1Q , Q = P
3α−2−
2 ) from the following observation
y1 −
√
Ph11v1,c =
√
Pαh12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
P 2α−1g′ + z1 (200)
where 2·Ω(ξ,Q),{ξ ·a : a ∈ Z∩[−2Q, 2Q]}, and g′,h12h21u2+
√
P 2−3αh11h22v1,p+
√
P 1−2αh12h11v2,p.
It holds true that |g′| ≤ 3√2 for any realizations of g′ in this case with 2/3 < α ≤ 3/4. Let svu, v2,c+u1
and let sˆvu be the estimate of svu. Then from Lemma 1 we can conclude that
Pr[svu 6= sˆvu|v1,c = vˆ1,c]→ 0, as P →∞.
At this point, we have
Pr[svu 6= sˆvu]
=Pr[v1,c = vˆ1,c] · Pr[svu 6= sˆvu|v1,c = vˆ1,c] + Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c] · Pr[svu 6= sˆvu|v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]
≤Pr[svu 6= sˆvu|v1,c = vˆ1,c] + Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0 as P →∞. (201)
In the third step, we remove the decoded v2,c + u1 from y1 and then decode u2 ∈ Ω(ξ = γu2 · 1Q , Q =
P
3α−2−
2 ). With the similar steps as before, from Lemma 1 we can conclude
Pr[u2 6= uˆ2]→ 0 as P →∞. (202)
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In the final step, similarly, we remove the decoded u2 from y1 and then decode v1,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,p ·
1
Q
, Q = P
1−α−
2 ), with error probability given as
Pr[v1,p 6= vˆ1,p]→ 0 as P →∞. (203)
By combining the results of (199) and (203), it holds true that the error probability of estimating
{v1,c, v1,p} from y1 is
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}] ≤ Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c] + Pr[v1,p 6= vˆ1,p]→ 0 as P →∞
which completes the proof for the case of k = 1. Due to the symmetry, the proof for the case of k = 2
follows from the above steps, with the roles of users interchanged.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The proof of Lemma 3 is very similar to the proof of Lemma 2. In this case we will prove that, when
3/2 ≤ α ≤ 2, and given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (63)-(65), the error probability of estimating
vk,c from yk is
Pr[vk,c 6= vˆk,c]→ 0 as P →∞
for k = 1, 2, where vˆk,c is the corresponding estimate for vk,c based on the observation yk expressed in
(66) and (67).
Due to the symmetry we will focus on the proof for the first user (k = 1). In the first step, we estimate
u2 ∈ Ω(ξ = γu2 · 1Q , Q = P
2−α−
2 ) from y1 by treating the other signals as noise, where y1 is expressed
in (66). Note that y1 in (66) can be rewritten as
y1 =
√
Pαh12h21u2 +
√
P g˜ + z1 (204)
where
g˜,h12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
P−(α−1)h11h22v1,c.
It holds true that
|g˜| ≤ 3
√
2
for any realizations of g˜, under the regime of 3/2 ≤ α ≤ 2. Then, from Lemma 1 we can conclude that
the error probability of estimating u2 from y1 is
Pr[u2 6= uˆ2]→ 0, as P →∞. (205)
In the second step, we remove the decoded u2 from y1 and then estimate v2,c + u1 ∈ 2 · Ω(ξ =
γu1 · 1Q , Q = P
2−α−
2 ) from the following observation
y1 −
√
Pαh12h21u2 =
√
Ph12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
P 2−αh11h22v1,c + z1. (206)
It holds true that |h11h22v1,c| ≤
√
2 for any realizations of v1,c. Let svu, v2,c + u1 and let sˆvu be the
estimate of svu. Then, from Lemma 1 we can conclude that
Pr[svu 6= sˆvu|u2 = uˆ2]→ 0, as P →∞
and that
Pr[svu 6= sˆvu] ≤Pr[svu 6= sˆvu|u2 = uˆ2] + Pr[u2 6= uˆ2]→ 0 as P →∞. (207)
In the final step, we remove the decoded v2,c +u1 from y1 and then decode v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,c · 1Q , Q =
P
2−α−
2 ) from the following observation
y1 −
√
Pαh12h21u2 −
√
Ph12h11(v2,c + u1) =
√
P 2−αh11h22v1,c + z1.
At this point one can easily conclude that the associated error probability is
Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0 as P →∞ (208)
which completes the proof for the case k = 1, as well as the proof for the case k = 2 due to the symmetry.
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APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
We will prove Lemma 5 in this section. Specifically, we will prove that, when 1 ≤ α ≤ 3/2 and given
the signal design in (32)-(34) and (96)-(98), then for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2,
the error probability of estimating vk,c from yk is
Pr[vk,c 6= vˆk,c]→ 0 as P →∞
for k = 1, 2, where vˆk,c is the corresponding estimate for vk,c based on the observation yk expressed in
(99) and (100). Similar to the proof of Lemma 4, this proof will use the approaches of noise removal and
signal separation.
Due to the symmetry we will focus on the proof for the first user (k = 1). Let us first rewrite y1
expressed in (99) as
y1 =
√
P 2−αh11h22v1,c +
√
Ph12h11(v2,c + u1) +
√
Pαh12h21u2 + z1
=
√
P 2−4α/3+ · 2γ · (g¯0q¯0 +
√
Pα−1g¯1q¯1 +
√
P 2α−2g¯2q¯2) + z1
=
√
P 2−4α/3+ · 2γ · x¯s + z1 (209)
where x¯s,(g¯0q¯0 +
√
Pα−1g¯1q¯1 +
√
P 2α−2g¯2q¯2) and
g¯0,h11h22, g¯1,h12h11, g¯2,h12h21
q¯0,
Qmax
2γ
· v1,c, q¯1, Qmax
2γ
· (v2,c + u1), q¯2, Qmax
2γ
· u2, Qmax,P
α/3−
2
for a given constant γ ∈ (0, 1
4
√
2
]
(see (35)), v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γ · 1Q , Q = P
α/3−
2 ), v2,c + u1 ∈ 2 · Ω(ξ =
2γ · 1
Q
, Q = P
α/3−
2 ) and u2 ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γ · 1Q , Q = P
α/3−
2 ). Based on our definitions, it holds true that
q¯0, q¯1, q¯2 ∈ Z , |q¯0| ≤ Qmax, |q¯1| ≤ 2Qmax, |q¯2| ≤ Qmax,
√
Pα−1 ∈ Z+ and √P 2α−2 ∈ Z+ for this case
with 1 ≤ α ≤ 3/2. Let us consider the minimum distance for x¯s defined as
d¯min(g¯0, g¯1, g¯2), min
q¯0,q¯2,q¯′0,q¯
′
2∈Z∩[−Qmax,Qmax]
q¯1,q¯′1∈Z∩[−2Qmax,2Qmax]
(q¯0,q¯1,q¯2)6=(q¯′0,q¯′1,q¯′2)
|g¯0(q¯0 − q¯′0) +
√
Pα−1g¯1(q¯1 − q¯′1) +
√
P 2α−2g¯2(q¯2 − q¯′2)|. (210)
The following Lemma 11 provides a result regarding the lower bound on the minimum distance d¯min.
Lemma 11. Consider the case α ∈ [1, 3/2], and consider some constants δ ∈ (0, 1] and  > 0. Given the
signal design in (32)-(34) and (96)-(98), then the minimum distance d¯min defined in (210) is bounded by
dmin ≥ δP−
2−4α/3
2 (211)
for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 \ H¯out, and the Lebesgue measure of the outage set
H¯out ⊆ (1, 2]2×2 , denoted by L(H¯out), satisfies
L(H¯out) ≤ 258048δ · P− 2 . (212)
Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof for Lemma 7. We will consider the case of 1 ≤ α ≤ 3/2.
Let
β¯, δP−
2−4α/3
2 , A¯1,P
α−1
2 , A¯2,Pα−1
g¯0,h11h22, g¯1,h12h11, g¯2,h12h21
Q0, 2Qmax, Q1, 4Qmax, Q2, 2Qmax, Qmax,P
α/3−
2
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for some  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Let us define the event
B¯(q¯0, q¯1, q¯2),{(g¯0, g¯1, g¯2) ∈ (1, 4]3 : |g¯0q¯0 + A¯1g¯1q¯1 + A¯2g¯2q¯2| < β¯} (213)
and set
B¯,
⋃
q¯0,q¯1,q¯2∈Z:
(q¯0,q¯1,q¯2)6=0,
|q¯k|≤Qk ∀k
B(q¯0, q¯1, q¯2). (214)
From Lemma 6, the Lebesgue measure of B¯, denoted by L(B¯), is bounded by
L(B¯) ≤ 504β¯
(
2 min
{
2Qmax,
2Qmax
Pα−1
}
+ Q˜′2 ·min
{
4Qmax,
2Qmax
P
α−1
2
,
Pα−1Q˜′2
P
α−1
2
}
+ 2 min
{
4Qmax,
2Qmax
P
α−1
2
}
+ Q˜′1 ·min
{
2Qmax,
2Qmax
Pα−1
,
P
α−1
2 · 4Qmax
Pα−1
})
= 504β¯
(4Qmax
Pα−1
+ Q˜′2 ·
2Qmax
P
α−1
2
+
4Qmax
P
α−1
2
+ Q˜′1 ·
2Qmax
Pα−1
)
= 504β¯
(4Qmax
Pα−1
+ 2Qmax ·min{1, 16P−α−12 } · 2Qmax
P
α−1
2
+
4Qmax
P
α−1
2
+ 4Qmax · 2Qmax
Pα−1
)
≤ 504β¯
(4Qmax
Pα−1
+ 2Qmax · 16 · 2Qmax
Pα−1
+
4Qmax
P
α−1
2
+ 4Qmax · 2Qmax
Pα−1
)
≤ 504β¯ · 16Qmax
P
α−1
2
·max{16Qmax
P
α−1
2
, 1}
= 504β¯ · 16P 1−2α/3−2 ·max{16P 1−2α/3−2 , 1}
≤ 504β¯ · 16P 1−2α/3−2 · 16P 1−2α/32
= 504δP−
2−4α/3
2 · 16P 1−2α/3−2 · 16P 1−2α/32
= 129024δ · P− 2 (215)
for a constant δ ∈ (0, 1], where
Q˜′1 = min
{
4Qmax, 8 · max{2Qmax, P
α−1 · 2Qmax}
P
α−1
2
}
= min
{
4Qmax, 8P
α−1
2 · 2Qmax
}
= 4Qmax
Q˜′2,min
{
2Qmax, 8 · max{2Qmax, P
α−1
2 · 4Qmax}
Pα−1
}
= 2Qmax ·min{1, 16P−α−12 }.
The set B¯ can be considered as an outage set. For any triple (g¯0, g¯1, g¯2) outside the outage set B¯, i.e.,
(g¯0, g¯1, g¯2) /∈ B¯, it is apparent that d¯min(g¯0, g¯1, g¯2) ≥ δP− 2−4α/32 . In our setting g¯0,h11h22, g¯1,h12h11
and g¯2,h12h21. Let us define H¯out as the collection of the quadruples (h11, h12, h22, h21) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 such
that the corresponding triples (g¯0, g¯1, g¯2) are in the outage set B, that is,
H¯out,{(h11, h12, h22, h21) ∈ (1, 2]2×2 : (g¯0, g¯1, g¯2) ∈ B¯}.
By following the similar steps in (114)-(116), one can bound the Lebesgue measure of H¯out as:
L(H¯out) ≤ 258048δ · P− 2 . (216)
Now we complete the proof of this lemma.
At this point, we go back to the expression of y1 in (209), i.e.,
y1 =
√
P 2−4α/3+ · 2γ · x¯s + z1.
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Based on our definition, the minimum distance for x¯s is d¯min defined in (210). Lemma 11 reveals that,
under the channel condition {hk`} /∈ H¯out, the minimum distance for x¯s is bounded by d¯min ≥ δP− 2−4α/32 ,
which implies that x¯s can be estimated from y1 and the corresponding error probability vanishes as
P → ∞. Note that in this case, the minimum distance for
√
P 2−4α/3+ · 2γ · x¯s is lower bounded by√
P  · 2γδ. Once x¯s is decoded correctly, then the three symbols q¯0, Qmax2γ · v1,c, q¯1, Qmax2γ · (v2,c + u1),
and q¯2, Qmax2γ · u2 can be recovered from x¯s = (g¯0q¯0 +
√
Pα−1g¯1q¯1 +
√
P 2α−2g¯2q¯2) due to the fact that
g¯0, g¯1, g¯2 are rationally independent. Then, we can conclude that the error probability for decoding vk,c is
Pr[vk,c 6= vˆk,c]→ 0 as P →∞ (217)
for k = 1 and 1 ≤ α ≤ 3/2, given the signal design in (32)-(34) and (96)-(98). This result holds true
for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×2 except for an outage set H¯out ⊆ (1, 2]2×2 with Lebesgue
measure L(H¯out) satisfying
L(H¯out)→ 0, as P →∞
(see (216)). Due to the symmetry, the result in (217) also holds true for the case of k = 2.
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